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Abstract: This paper strives to reread and recontextualise the ideas of Ibn Khaldun on 
diversity, group feeling and political legitimacy, most specifically within the contemporary 
context of nation-state. Ibn Khaldun states, “A dynasty rarely establishes itself firmly in lands 
with many different tribes and groups”. A high level of diversity (with no social cohesion), is 
regarded as a peril rather than a promise, most particularly to the stability of the state or 
dynasty. This paper address the following problems: (a) what societal cultures which 
contribute to the Indonesian nation-building; (b) how do the minority groups perceive their 
belonging to the nation and how do they respond to the nation-building. 
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Öz: Bu makale, İbn Haldun’nun çeşitlilik, grup hissiyatı ve siyasi meşruiyet üzerine fikirlerinin 
bilhassa çağdaş ulus-devlet bağlamı içerisinde yeniden okunması ve tekrar 
kavramsallaştırılmasını amaçlamaktadır. İbn Haldun, “bir hanedanın birçok kabile ve grubun 
olduğu topraklarda kendini kuvvetli bir biçimde tesis etmesi ender görülür” cümlesini sarf 
etmiştir. Yüksek seviyede bir çeşitlilik (sosyal bağlılık olmaksızın), vaatten ziyade tehlike 
olarak addedilir. Bu tehlike özellikle de devletin veyahut hanedanlığın istikrarına karşı bir 
tehlikedir. Bu makale aşağıda belirtilen sorunlara ışık tutmaya çalışacaktır: (a) Hangi toplumsal 
kültürler Endonezya’da ulus oluşturmaya katkıda bulunmaktadır? (b) Azınlık grupları, ulusa 
olan aidiyetlerini nasıl  algılıyorlar ve ulus oluşumuna nasıl tepkide bulunuyorlar?   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulus Kurma, Aidiyet, Asabiye, İbn Haldun 
 
 
                                                            
* This article is a review of the paper presented at the ”4th International Ibn Khaldun Symposium“ organized 
on 19-21 May 2017 in Istanbul. 
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1. State, Islam and Nation-Building 
Up to now, the idea of the nation-state has not lost its enchantment, in the face of the 
courses of globalisation, supranational institution-building on a regional plane (e.g. 
European Union) and growing transnational cooperation. The project of nation-
building is relevant for those states who obtained independence only lately as well as 
those who have been cautious of their independence ever since Derichs and Heberer 
(2006: 4). 
 
Nation-building in the context of Asia, in general, and in Indonesia, in particular, is 
distinct to that in Europe. Gungwu points out: 
 
“In Asia, we know that some of our nation-states are more artificial. This is true not 
only of Asia, but also in Africa and other places as well, places that have come out of 
recent imperial and colonial experiences during which borders were drawn by outside 
interests. These external factors have created conditions that have made the borders 
meaningless for some people and meaningful for others. Once there was the concept 
of borders, then you have, as scholars like Benedict Anderson have suggested, 
imagined national communities, or people seeking to re-imagine themselves as a 
nation within borders already drawn.” (2004: 4). 
 
Even though Muslims are the majority, Indonesia does not install Islam as the basis 
of the state. The first president of the country Soekarno (r. 1945-1967) inaugurated 
Pancasila as the foundation of the Republic. This was due to the strong nationalistic 
aspirations among the founding fathers, who were of the opinion that installing one 
exclusivist ideology as the basis of the state would potentially jeopardize the unity of 
the nation, since Indonesia was plural in terms of religions and ethnicities 
(Hamayotsu, 2002: 2-3).  
 
The Pancasila as state ideology accordingly marks Indonesia as “pluralist state”. The 
Pancasila comprises of five principles which include: (a) belief in one God, (b) a just 
and civilized humanitarianism, (c) national unity, (d) Indonesian democracy through 
consultation and consensus, and (e) social justice. It is worth remarking that the 
Pancasila state is not a secular state. This is because the first pillar of this ideology 
reads as ‘the belief in a single Deity’.  
 
The Indonesian people assign the ‘Indonesian language’ as their national language. 
This language is a romanisation of Malay language. It is worth remarking that 
Indonesia did not choose Javanese as the national language, although Javanese 
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constitute the most dominant ethnicity in Indonesia and accordingly the Javanese 
people have high potentials to exert their language as the national language. It was 
however not the case. The romanised Malay, which was then called ‘Indonesian 
language’, was chosen as the national language due to the fact that this language is 
simple and has been used as lingua franca among the people in Malay-Indonesian 
archipelago. Indonesian language, accordingly, contributes to the nation-building 
and to the shared identity of the people across the country. The case of Indonesian 
language shows that it is not necessarily the dominant societal culture which exerts 
an influence in the construction of nation-building.  
 
In the process of nation-building, the diversity of the nations could not be 
accommodated completely, and for that reason this should be domesticated. Schefold 
(1998: 261) reveals that ethnic ‘primordial attachments’ embody a natural emotional 
need for social self-assertion, and consequently these attachments continue to be 
sustained by way of all processes of modernisation. In the new and scarcely 
consolidated states, however, these attachments constitute an impending danger, as 
they menace to challenge national solidarity. The only pragmatic reaction consists in 
arranging to ‘domesticate’ them. 
 
2. The Intricate Interplays Between Religion and Nationalism 
Indonesian nationalism, according to Menchik (2014: 594) represents ‘godly 
nationalism’. This type of nationalism is construed as “an imagined community 
bound by a common, orthodox theism and mobilized through state in cooperation 
with religious organizations in society”. Menchik goes on to explain “as long as 
citizens believe in one of the state-sanctioned pathways to God, they become full 
members of civil society and receive state protection and other benefits of 
citizenship”. In this sense, godly nationalism inhabits a middle position between 
secular and religious nationalism (Menchik, 2014: 600). The belief in one God, or 
monotheism, accordingly constitutes an important foundation of nation-building in 
Indonesia. 
 
For Menchik (2014: 599) “Indonesia contains a form of nationalism that is neither 
Islamic nor secular, but rather exclusively and assertively religious. Active state 
support o religion did not die in 1945 with the failure of Jakarta Charter and the 
state’s embrace of Pancasila…. The privileging of religion is made manifest through 
state support for religious orthodoxy over luminal and heterodox faiths”. 
 
The notion of ‘godly nationalism’ is grounded on the conception that “religious 
practice and discourse may be a constitutive part of national identity rather than 
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epiphenomenal or a smokescreen for hoary political interests”. Menchik goes on to 
say that “Indonesian nationalism continues to be rooted in religious solidarities” 
although “it is not an Islamic state” (Menchik, 2014: 596-598). In this regard, we may 
understand that the Nahdlatul Ulama from the very beginning suggested that Islam 
did not run in counter with nationalism, and accordingly they brought forward the 
adagio of “hub al-watan min al-iman” (loving the nation is a part of Islamic faith).  
 
The endurance of a godly nation necessitates privileging a certain beliefs and 
persecuting “acts of deviance as blasphemy”. In this regards, the persecution of the 
Ahmadiyya in modern-day Indonesia is a logical consequence of this tendency and 
politics. (Menchik, 2014: 595). Menchik argues that the cases of violence against the 
Ahmadiyya demonstrate that “intolerance and nation building are part of a mutually 
constitutive process”. He goes to elucidate that “the campaign against Ahmadiyya is 
part of a broader effort by civil society and the state to constitute the nation through 
belief in God. In that respect, contemporary intolerance to Ahmadiyya is merely the 
most recent manifestation of a longstanding effort to promote godly nationalism 
while dislodging secular or Islamic alternatives”. For Menchik (2014: 595), “the 
debates over blasphemy are an attempt (by Muslim civil society) or disrupt (by 
liberals) norms and laws that help constitute the nation through belief in one God”.  
 
Menchik’s survey implies that the degree of tolerance among the Nahldlatul Ulama is 
higher than that among the Muhammadiyah. Menchik (2014: 593) explains that “75 
percent of Muhammadiyah leaders and 59 percent of Nahdlatul Ulama leaders said 
that no Ahmadiyya member should be allowed to become the mayor in Jakarta”. 
Menchik brings forward this survey to support his argument that intolerance has 
been prevalent among contemporary Indonesian civil society organisations, on the 
one hand; and to reject the thesis that Islam in Indonesia constitutes a “marginalised 
and relatively unimportant in political sense and greatly overshadowed by a form of 
political thinking usually called secular nationalism”.  
 
Assyaukanie highlights three models of the relation between Islam and state: (a) an 
Islamic state governed by Islamic law, (b) a secular liberal democratic state, and (c) a 
religious democratic state. For Assyaukanie, A religious democratic state does not 
acknowledge the adherents of heterodox faiths (Menchik, 2014: 599). 
 
The Indonesian constitution guarantees the people’s freedom in practicing their 
respective religions. The government, however, restricts the number of recognised 
religions in this country. The first principle of state’s ideology, i.e. ‘belief in one 
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God’, implies the obligation of every citizen to embrace a religion; accordingly the 
government regards those who do not attach themselves to any one religion as 
subversive. The government also compels some religions to modify their respective 
doctrines in order to conform to the principle of monotheism (Franke 2006: 61-82). 
The Buddhists, for instance, advocated the principle of ‘Adibuddha’ as the only 
Buddhist God that should be assigned to conform to the Pancasila principle of ‘belief 
in one God’. The Balinese Hindus also formulated the principle of ‘Ida Sang Hyang 
Widhi Wasa’ (the All-One God), which is identified with the principle of ‘belief in one 
God’. This demonstrates that Indonesia adopted ‘restricted pluralism’ (Franke 2006).  
 
In principle, each of the six recognised religious communities is granted equal rights 
before the law. These religious communities are granted equal access to public space 
and consent to build houses of worship within reasonable permissible limits 
(Adeney-Risakota 2009:19). The adherents of “local indigenous religions” and other 
unrecognised religions do not enjoy the same rights as the adherents of recognised 
religions.  
 
3. Minorities, Belonging and Nation-Building 
Kymlicka (2001) brought forward three characteristic phases of the discourse on 
minority rights. The first stage of the dispute is put within the circumstance of 
competition between communitarianism and liberalism. The second stage of the 
discussion is concerned with potential scope for minority rights within the structure 
of liberal theory. The third phase of the discussion revolves around the query how 
some minority rights claims constitute a reaction to, or are related to, nation-
building policies. 
 
Kymlicka (2001) points out that nation building is mostly based on dominant or 
majority ‘societal culture’. Kymlicka goes on to explain that there are at least three 
varied strategies which the minorities may take in terms of majority nation-building: 
(a) admitting the integration into the majority societal culture; (b) striving to 
establish their own societal culture and contesting to state nation-building; and (c) 
accepting the enduring marginalisation. 
 
3.1. Ethnic Minorities and Nation-Building 
There are at least three discourses pertaining to the ways in which Chinese minorities 
has been accommodated in Indonesia. These discourses include assimilation, 
multiculturalism and hybridity. Under Suharto regime (1966-1998), assimilation was 
the prevailing discourse, which compelled the Chinese to integrate themselves into 
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the national body (Hoon, 2006: 149). Schefold (1998: 270) points out that all 
inhabitants of Chinese descent are under heavy pressure to give up their ethnic 
traditions and assimilate. In May 1998, Indonesia witnessed anti-Chinese riots which 
clearly demonstrated the disappointment of the policy of assimilation (Hoon, 2006: 
149). 
 
Post-Suharto Indonesian leaders were aware of the failure of the policy of 
assimilation, and accordingly sanctioned the policy of multiculturalism in order to 
rebuild the nation. This policy is believed to be in conformity with the national motto 
‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’ (Unity in Diversity). Multiculturalism tries to challenge cultural 
homogenisation by recognising the coexistence and equal representation of varied 
peoples and cultures within a nation-state (Hoon, 2006: 149). Multiculturalism strives 
to allocate a space for the oppressed minorities and afford them a subjectivity, 
identity, and personhood by supporting individuals within that minority to ‘narrate’ 
their own experiences of repression. 
 
There are nevertheless debates on multiculturalism in Indonesia. Some scholars 
criticise that in the politics of multiculturalism the frontiers of difference and the 
concept of plurality are still resolved by particular hegemonic and dominant group(s). 
They also disapprove of this policy since it assumes that each person enjoys only one 
distinct cultural identity. Multiculturalism accordingly does not recognise an individual 
who possesses more than one identity.These scholars argue further that by 
unconsciously setting obvious delineations and boundaries between cultures, 
multiculturalism has conquered its own intention the mono-cultural nation by way of 
an assimilation policy. People who do not fit into any of those defined cultural 
categories will be left with no choice but to ‘assimilate’ into the only officially 
‘prescribed’ cultures that are available” (Hoon, 2006: 154, 159). This is in line with 
Amartya Sen’s criticism (see: Ghoshal 2018) towards multiculturalism. Sen is of the 
opinion that what some people regard as multiculturalism is in fact ‘plural mono-
culturalism’, in which every ethnic communities live in isolation from other 
communities. 
 
The last notion, namely hybridity, is on the making. Hybridity is thought to 
substantiate the policy of multiculturalism. Hoon (2006: 163) points out that 
“multicultural conditions can only be lived out, regenerated and transformed with the 
recognition of hybridity”. Hybridity in this sense is related to “the idea of cultural 
syncretism, which foregrounds complicated cultural entanglement rather than 
cultural difference by multiculturalism”. It is explained that the politics of hybridity 
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has been inherent to the course of dislodgment and migration, and has been 
exercised by locals and migrants in their every day conciliation and production of 
their identities, deliberately or involuntarily (Hoon, 2006: 159-160).  
 
It is worth noting that hybridity is an incessant and frequently convoluted course of 
cultural translation and negotiation. However it is worth remarking that hybridity does 
not inevitably lead to empowerment. In some instances, even where individuals take up 
the cultural features of their host society, they may still continue to be marginalised 
and othered as ‘foreigners’. This can be observed for instance in the case of Chinese-
Indonesians under the Suharto regime who never acknowledged as true Indonesian 
(Hoon, 2006: 161-162). Hybridity is accordingly in need of recognition from the state 
and culturally dominant groups. 
 
The policy of hybridity would appreciate the people with multiple identities and 
consequently would help diminish the rigid line between ‘pribumi’ (natives) and 
‘non-pribumi’ (non-natives) (Hoon, 2006: 161). In line with this, Homi Bhabha, as 
cited by Hoon (2006: 160) maintains that the endurance of cultural diversity will be 
grounded not on the multiplicity of cultures or the exoticism of multiculturalism or, 
but on the inscription and expression of culture’s hybridity. In this regard, we may see 
that multiculturalism ideally should not only recognise the diversity of ethnicities and 
religions at macro-societal level, but also the plurality within each ethnic or religious 
group (Hoon 2006: 160). By acknowledging this diversity at the micro level, 
multiculturalism could be transformed into ‘genuine multiculturalism’. . This, 
according to Hoon would avoid being confined to exhibiting an assortment of mono-
cultural individuals. 
 
The Jakarta governor election in 2017 demonstrates the process of substantiating 
democracy and multiculturalism in the modern-day Indonesia. Basuki Tjajaha Purnama 
(b. 1966) and Anies Baswedan (b. 1969) were shortlisted to participate in the second 
round of the election. Purnama is Christian-Chinese, whilst Baswedan is Muslim-Arab. 
The discourses of ‘native versus non-native’ and ‘Muslim versus non-Muslim’ were 
prevalent during the election, and were most specifically aimed at maximising the votes. 
Although the final result of the election shows that Purnama only got 42%, it remains a 
significant number if we look at the fact that Purnama assigns a double minority 
(Chinese and Christian). He succeeded in attracting the votes and sympathies from 
rational voters, most notably from culturally dominant groups. The future of 
multiculturalism accordingly has still good prospects in Indonesia. During the Suharto-
era (1967-1998) we could not imagine that a Christian-Chinese could be elected as a 
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governor candidate, and could obtain a significant number of votes. Chinese-
Indonesians during the Suharto-regime were dominant in terms of economics but they 
suffered discriminations most notably in public service.  
 
3.2. Religious Minorities and Nation-Building 
The term ‘religion’ in the context of Indonesia is worth remarking. In 1952 the 
Ministry of Religion (which was dominated by Muslims) brought out a restricted 
definition of religion: a religion should possess a holy book and a prophet. This sort 
of definition rules out the “mystical movement” and “local indigenous religion” as 
legitimate religious expressions of the Indonesian people (Mulder 1998: 22). There 
are several terms subsumed under the rubric of “mystical movement,” most notably 
aliran kebatinan, aliran kepercayaan and kejawen.1  
 
Some specialists believe that the state is in charge of directing the religious and 
mystical practices throughout the country. This can be seen in the inception of the 
PAKEM (Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, Inspection Body of the Mystical 
Sects of Society) under the Ministry of Justice in 1954. The Ministry of Religious 
Affairs under the “Surveillance Project of the Religious Activities and Sects” played a 
part in implementing this state policy as well. It was under this project that the 
government suggested that kepercayaans should return to their original religions 
(Stange 1986: 82).  
 
In 1979 the administration of the kepercayaan was placed under the Directorate of 
the Maintenance of the Adherents of the kepercayaan, Ministry of Education and 
Culture (Stange 1986: 91). The kepercayaan has been administrated under the 
Ministry of Education and Culture since the People’s Consultative Assembly thought 
it more suitable to subsume the kepercayaan into the category of culture than 
religion (Geels 1997: 83).  
 
The ‘heretic sects’ of Islam like al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah are also often included in the 
rubric of kepercayaan, and accordingly are placed under the surveillance of the 
“Inspection Body of the Mystical Sects of Society”. One Indonesian newspaper 
reported that one adherent of Ahmadiyah was forced to swear not as a Muslim but as 
an adherent of the kepercayaan when he acted as a witness in the court.2 
 
                                                            
1 Aliran kebatinan means a sect which is concerned with the inner self. Aliran kepercayaan literally means a 
sect of beliefs, whereas kejawen can be translated as Javanism (Stange 1986: 87).  
2 “Saksi Ahmadiyah disumpah di Luar Cara Islam”, Tempo, January 10, 2013. 
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Religious minorities in Indonesia do not enjoy fully their civil rights, and accordingly 
could not contribute the process of nation-building in the country. Even, the 
activities of these religious minorities are often considered as threat to national 
cohesion, most particularly by those coming from conservative groups. This blaming 
and accusation increase preceding general and local election. It is political 
entrepreneurs who often exploit these religious minorities during the election. Such 
slogans are prevalent during the election: the Shiism is a threat to Indonesian Unitary 
State; the Ahmadiyya is a cause of the country’s chaos and disunity, and the like. 
 
Despite the strong opposition from the conservative groups, the religious minorities 
strive to sustain their existence in Indonesia. They undertake some legal efforts to 
maintain their civil rights in the country. Some progressive activists and civil society 
organisations take a part in supporting their struggles for attaining civil rights. 
 
In this regard, we observe the significance of civil society in deepening nation-
building and multiculturalism. Kamali (2006: 39) prefers to stick to the definition of 
civil society which is offered by Craig Calhoun, as “a civil sphere in which people can 
organize their daily lives without the intervention of the state”. Kamali (2006: 39-40) 
rejects individualism and democratic institutions as the requirements for civil society. 
He would rather ground civil society on “the existence of influential civil groups and 
their institutions, which can, through established mechanisms, counterbalance state 
power”.  
 
4. Ibn Khaldun, State Formation and Nation-Building: Reflection and 
Contextualisation  
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) maintains that, in his work al-Muqaddima (Prolegomena), 
he develops a new science, which he calls ‘ilm al-’umran al-basharı (the science of 
human social organisation) or ‘ilm al-ijtima’ al-insanı (the science of human society) 
(Alatas 2006: 782). 
 
‘Asabiyya (social solidarity, social cohesion) occupies a central position in Ibn 
Khaldun’s theory. ‘Asabiyya is conceived by Ibn Khaldun as the “feeling of solidarity 
among the members of a group that is derived from the knowledge that they share a 
common descent” (Alatas 2006: 784). Ibn Khaldun (n.d.: 128) goes on to say: 
 
“asabiyya results only from blood relationship or something corresponding to it…. 
Clients and allies belong in the same category. The affection everybody has for his 
clients and allies results from the feeling of shame that comes to a person when one of 
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his neighbours, relatives or a blood relation in any degree of kinship is humiliated. The 
reason for it is that a client-master relationship leads to a close contact exactly, or 
approximately in the same way, as does common descent. In this vein, we may see that 
the ‘asabiyya is dealing with blood ties, clientelism and alliances.” (Lawrence 2015: 
318). 
 
According to Ibn Khaldun, ‘asabiyya covers three dimensions: (a) “kinship ties”, (b) “a 
socially cohesive religion such as Islam that provided a shared idiom legitimising the 
chieftain’s aspirations” for royal authority, and (c) “the strength of the chieftain 
through trade, booty, pillage and conquest” (Alatas 1993: 31). The role of religion in 
strengthening social cohesion is explained by Ibn Khaldun (n.d.: 151-152) in the 
following words:  
 
“When there is a prophet or saint among them, who calls upon them to fulfil the 
commands of God and rids them of blameworthy qualities and causes them to adopt 
praiseworthy ones, and who has them concentrate all their strength in order to make 
the truth prevail, they become fully united (as a social organisation) and obtain 
superiority and royal authority.” 
 
Elsewhere Ibn Khaldun (n.d.: 157-158) argues:  
 
Dynasties of wide power and large royal authority have their origin in religion based 
either on prophecy or on truthful propaganda. This is because royal authority results 
from superiority. Superiority results from ‘asabiyya. Only by God’s help in establishing 
His religion do individual come together in agreement to press their claims, and heart 
become united. 
 
Ibn Khaldun is considered one of the theorists of social cohesion, alongside with the 
modern sociologists such as Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). Ibn Khaldun is concerned 
with two main problems: (a) “What is it that keeps men together in society?” and (b) 
“what is it that leads them to identify with a social group, to accept and observe its 
norms, to subordinate their own individual interests to it, in some measure to accept 
the authority of its leaders, to think its thoughts and to internalise its aims?” (Gellner 
1975: 203). For Alatas (1993: 39), Ibn Khaldun’s notion of ‘asabiyya shares much in 
common with Durkheim’s notion of mechanical solidarity. Both notions are 
concerned with “solidarity that arises out of similar states of conscience, duties and 
responsibilities, that is, a low level in the division of labour”. 
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Muhammed Talbi, as cited by by Garrison (2012: 36-40), brings forward three 
constitutive features of ‘asabiyya. The first is “the cohesive force of the group, the 
bond needed to sustain and propel the group towards its goal”. The second is 
“voluntary individual subordination to a collective interest”. In this sense, Talbi 
conceives ‘asabiyya as the conscience that the group “has its uniqueness and its 
collective aspirations. Such a consciousness evokes a corporeal image of ‘asabiyya –
of something more than a group qua group of individuals, but of a single self with its 
own interests, kinetic force and telos”. The third character of ‘asabiyya is the 
“dialectic tension animating and propelling the group to seek power through 
conquest”. 
 
The dynasties are based upon the power of the dominant tribes (Alatas, 1993: 41). 
Ibn Khaldun (n.d.: 139-140) says: “The goal to which ‘asabiyya leads is royal 
authority. This is because… ‘asabiyya gives protection and makes mutual defense, 
the pressing of claims and every other kind of social activity”. Elsewhere he argues 
that “aggressive and defensive strength is obtained only through ‘asabiyya which 
means mutual affection and willingness to fight and die for each other” (Ibn Khaldun, 
n.d.: 154). He also stresses that “aggressive and defensive enterprises can succeed 
only with the help of ‘asabiyya (Ibn Khaldun, n.d.: 187-188). 
 
The ‘asabiyya holds an important position in building and sustaining the dynasty. 
The ‘asabiyya is accordingly needed at two domains: (a) state formation, (b) 
sustainability of the state. The ‘asabiyya is perceived as social capital in both state 
formation and state sustainability, if we employ a modern theory. 
 
State formation designates “the processes leading to the centralisation of political 
power within a well-defined territory”. The fundamental idea of state formation is 
“that societies organised as states will be more efficient externally and internally”. 
Another impetus of state formation is common defense abroad, as “the inhabitants of 
a state are in the same boat, sharing threats from the outside” (Osterud, 2011: 
2507).  
 
If we look into modern theories of political science, we begin to realise that Ibn 
Khaldun’s notion of ‘asabiyya has its parallels with the notion of nationalism. It is 
worth remarking that the notion of nationalism came up within the context of 
modern nation-state. The formation of modern nation-state was mostly grounded on 
nationalism. 
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Ibn Khaldun highlights the role of religion in strengthening the ‘asabiyya. Such a 
strong social cohesion is need for the formation and sustainability of the dynasty. In 
modern times, ideology could also play as a glue to foster the social cohesion. In the 
case of Indonesia, for instance, Pancasila is thought to be ideology which binds the 
people together. 
 
Nation-building in the context of Europe is mostly based on one societal culture. 
Most modern European states are rooted in one distinct identity. Asia is plural in 
terms of ethnicity and religion since the outset. Nation-building in postcolonial Asia 
was concerned most notably with drawing and imagining the boundaries of the 
nation. The dominant societal culture plays a great role in the process of nation-
building in Asia. 
 
Ibn Khaldun’s was concerned mostly with the state formation and state sustainability 
in pre-modern times. Nevertheless we could see parallels between Ibn Khaldun’s 
notion of ‘asabiyya and the modern conception of nation-building. Ibn Khaldun paid 
a great attention to the ‘asabiyya, most particularly from the dominant tribe, which 
plays a significant role in establishing and sustaining the dynasty. Ibn Khaldun (n.d., 
132-133) explains: 
 
“…leadership exists only through superiority, and superiority only through ‘asabiyya, as 
we have mentioned before. Leadership over people, therefore, must, of necessity, derive 
from ‘asabiyya that is superior to each individual ‘asabiyya. Each individual ‘asabiyya 
that becomes aware of the superiority of the ‘asabiyya of the leader is ready to obey and 
follow that leader.” 
 
Elsewhere Ibn Khaldun (.n.d.: 166-167) asserts the role of dominant ‘asabiyya in 
uniting the people: “One of the various tribal‘asabiyya must be superior to all 
(others), in order to be able to bring them together, to unite them, and to weld them 
into one ‘asabiyya comprising all various groups”. The modern concept of nation-
building is also based on majority or dominant societal culture. Nation-building is 
accordingly not free from power, namely from the dominant group with its societal 
culture. 
 
Ibn Khaldun (n.d., 164-166) points out “a dynasty rarely establishes itself firmly in 
lands with many different tribes and groups”. He goes on to explain:  
 
“The reason for this is the differences in opinions and desires. Behind each opinion and 
desire, there is ‘asabiyya defending it. At any time, therefore, there is much opposition 
to a dynasty and rebellion against it, even if the dynasty possesses ‘asabiyya, because 
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each ‘asabiyya under the control of the ruling dynasty thinks that it has in itself enough 
strength and power.” 
 
In this regard, a high level of plurality without social cohesion is considered as a 
threat rather than an opportunity, most specifically to the solidity of dynasty. It 
deserves mentioning that Ibn Khaldun did not see that ethnic plurality by itself as the 
menace to stability of the dynasty. His statement is to be comprehended within the 
framework of his major concept of ‘social cohesion’.  
 
Ethnic diversities could become a capital if these diversities are united by religion, for 
instance, and accordingly constitute a social organisation. This is observable from 
Ibn Khaldun’s (n.d.: 163-164) words:  
 
“Representatives of ‘asabiyya are the militiamen who settle in the provinces and 
territories of the dynasty and are spread over them. The more numerous the tribes and 
groups of a large dynasty are, the stronger and larger are its provinces and lands. Their 
royal authority, therefore, is wider. An example of this was the Muslim dynasty when 
God united the power of the Arabs in Islam.” 
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